ORR review of RSSB

The RSSB Board has recently requested the Office of Rail Regulation to carry out a review of the company, in line with Schedule 6 of our Constitution Agreement.

ORR has now initiated the review with a consultation document, which is available on their web site at the address below.

The review is considering

> What RSSB currently undertakes
> Are these activities still needed, and if so:
>   - Is RSSB the appropriate organisation to do them?

ORR is seeking responses by 7 May 2010 and we would encourage all our stakeholders to ensure that their views are made known through this process http://www.rail-reg.gov.uk/server/show/ConWebDoc.9985

RGS Catalogue - change to quarterly publication

From 30 June 2010 RSSB’s standards publication schedule will change to quarterly. Accordingly the Catalogue of Railway Group Standards and revised or new documents will, in future, be published in March, June, September and December.

The change was proposed by Network Rail to bring RSSB’s publication dates in line with Network Rail’s standards publication schedule. It is anticipated

railway group
standards changes

For details of changes to Railway Group Standards view the Latest Updates page on the RGS Online website www.rgsonline.co.uk
that the change will bring benefits by reducing the costs of training and briefing changes.

This change was approved by Industry Standards Co-ordination Committee (ISCC) on 12 February 2010 following an industry wide consultation. RSSB’s response to consultation comments can be viewed at


Documents published in June 2010 and subsequent dates will now come into force (or cease to be in force) three months after publication. The date of publication will remain the first Saturday of the publication month.

For further information please contact Marie Marks, head of standards management on 020 3142 5575 or email marie.marks@rssb.co.uk.

Withdrawal of GM/RT2470 Wheelset Supplier Qualification

Wheelsets and associated components are single-point-failure, safety-critical items, and control of their manufacture and assembly is essential to reduce the risk of failure and therefore ensure safe operation of the railway.

Currently GM/RT2470 mandates that wheelsets and associated components shall only be procured from ‘approved’ wheelset suppliers and details the process for obtaining and maintaining approval.

As part of the implementation of the Railway Group Standard Code, GM/RT2470 is to be withdrawn as the requirements it contains are deemed to manage risks which are the responsibility of individual duty holders and are therefore out of scope for Railway Group Standards, as defined in the Railway Group Standards Code.

Withdrawal of the standard will be published in the April 2010 Railway Group Standards Catalogue and the document will cease to be in force on 05 June 2010.

To facilitate withdrawal of the standard and to ensure that suitable alternative arrangements are available, accepted industry ‘best practice’ developed under GM/RT2470 has been captured in RISAS briefing note BN-004 (RISAS M1A - Wheelsets and M1B - Wheelset Components) http://www.risas-online.org/.

Pilot assessments of wheelset and wheelset component suppliers were carried out in the UK and mainland Europe to test the application of the RISAS process and it was confirmed that RISAS certification will provide equivalent assurance when GM/RT2470 is withdrawn.

The Railways and Other Guided Transport Systems (Safety) Regulations 2006 requires Duty Holders to exercise appropriate care when procuring wheelsets and associated components and following withdrawal of GM/RT2470 this duty does not change.

Following withdrawal of GM/RT2470 Duty Holders will have the option to either use an industry agreed scheme or undertake their own assessments.

Wheelset and wheelset component suppliers falling due for surveillance or re-approval under GM/RT2470 will have the option to either obtain certification under an agreed industry scheme or restrict sales to customers who carry out their own assessments. It should be noted that RISAS is currently the only industry agreed scheme.

RISAS certification of wheelset and wheelset component suppliers is available now and suppliers achieving RISAS certification will be deemed to continue to meet the requirements of GM/RT2470.

It should be noted that the existing GM/RT2470 Approved Wheelset Supplier list has been transferred to http://www.risas-online.org/ and with the exception of assessments under GM/RT2470 in contract, no further entries will be included on the list and current listings will be withdrawn when their expiry date is reached.

A series of communications related to this important change will be released over the coming weeks and months aimed at buyers, suppliers and audit service providers outlining what the changes will mean to them.

For more information contact Andy Tandy, RISAS administrator on 020 3142 5376 or risas.admin@rssb.co.uk

For further information please contact Marie Marks, head of standards management on 020 3142 5575 or email marie.marks@rssb.co.uk.
New research on alcohol’s contribution to personal safety and security risk

The rail industry carries a number of passengers who have consumed alcohol. Most of them will travel safely without suffering injury, or being involved in anti-social or criminal behaviour. At the same time, the rail industry has to manage the risk associated with personal safety and security, to which alcohol consumption by passengers is a contributory factor.

The rail industry is increasingly aware of alcohol’s perceived role in exacerbating passenger safety at the platform-train interface and staff assaults. Previous research shows that 40% of passengers assaulted on the GB railways believe their assailant was intoxicated. Of those staff that had been assaulted over a recent six month period, 60% believe that their assailant was intoxicated.

In response, the cross-industry Rail Personal Security Group (RPSG), which includes Network Rail, train operating companies and British Transport Police, asked RSSB to commission a research project: T704 The contribution of alcohol to personal safety and security risk on the railways. The research considered a literature review, interviews and surveys with staff, data from incident databases including the Safety Management Information System (SMIS).

RSSB has now published T704 which includes a good practice guide, which has detailed descriptions of ten measures aimed at both reducing the occurrence of alcohol related incidents and also managing such incidents should they arise. Along with this, the document includes guidance on implementation as well as relevant case studies showing what’s worked within and outside the rail industry.

There is also a section explaining how to identify the nature and extent of alcohol-related problems, and a framework to help managers identify measures that are likely to be most effective in dealing with these.

The findings and guide have been showcased at the rail industry Community Safety Forum – Calling time on anti-social behaviour - on 18 March, hosted by RSSB. This event also heard from Passenger Focus, whose own recently-published research on anti-social behaviour echoes some of the findings in T704. RSSB’s Board has also discussed the issue of operational safety at the platform-train interface, and the role that alcohol consumption plays, including reference to the T704 work. RPSG is in the process of reviewing the findings and is considering whether there are areas where a coordinated industry response to alcohol-related problems is needed.

For more information contact Jill Moore, research manager, jill.moore@rssb.co.uk

ETCS System Description Guidance Note

The European Train Control System (ETCS), essentially the signalling and automatic train operation part of the European Rail Traffic Management System (ERTMS), is being deployed throughout Europe (and farther afield) and now on British trains and infrastructure with the initial application on the Cambrian Lines in Wales.

As part of the Network Rail led cross-industry ERTMS Programme, RSSB has been developing an operational concept for national deployment of ERTMS. During this development, it became apparent that there was a need to make available to the industry technical information to aid understanding of what ETCS is. This has been produced in the form of a Guidance Note.

The ETCS System Description Guidance Note seeks to provide sufficient information to enable infrastructure managers and railway undertakings to understand the basic principles of ETCS and its part in the safe movement of trains. It has been published in the February 2010 edition of the Railway Group Standards Catalogue.

The Guidance Note describes the system architecture and behaviour of the ETCS as it will be implemented in Great Britain. It covers the overall context of ETCS as part of the European Traffic Management System (ERTMS), the system architecture of ETCS including the supporting equipment which it requires, the system behaviour of ETCS in terms of application levels and operational modes, the protection functions which ETCS provides, ETCS data and signalling principles in relation to Level 0 and Level 2 without lineside signals.

The Guidance Note GE/GN8605 can be found on www.rgsonline.co.uk. For more information please contact Alex Savopoulos, signalling specialist on 020 3142 5502 or email alex.savopoulos@rssb.co.uk.

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GK/RT0028 Infrastructure Based Train Detection Interface Requirements

The new standard Infrastructure Based Train Detection Interface Requirements (GK/RT0028) and the associated guidance note (GK/GN0628) are due for publication in April 2010 and the compliance date is June 2010.

The standard is the result of applying the filtering process to the following existing RGS standards in accordance with Railway Group Standards Code, and combining the retained measures into a single standard:

> GK/RT0011 Train Detection,
> GK/RT0217 Technical Requirements for Axle Counters,
> JDP C006 Class 140 – 165 Trains not fitted with Track Circuit Actuators, and
> GK/RT0027 Resetting and Restoration to service of Signalling Systems

The retained measures focus on the interface between train detection systems and railway vehicles, for example,

> The requirements for assessing compatibility between the train detection systems and railway vehicles when new or modified infrastructure or vehicles are introduced to ensure safety operation of the affected systems.

> The requirements describe setting the boundaries of the train detection sections - so as to achieve continuous detection of trains (if required) for various types of vehicles and to avoid situations when rail vehicles approach the other vehicle or infrastructure too closely which may cause collisions.

The accompanying guidance notes (GK/RT0628 Guidance on Infrastructure Based Train Detection Interface Requirements) provides guidance on the interpretation of, and rationale for, the requirements.

For further information, please contact Jianhong Jin, control-command & signalling engineer on 020 3142 5524 or email jianhong.jin@rssb.co.uk

How to Obtain More Information about a Document on www.RGSonline.co.uk

In response to a number of enquiries received via the RSSB Enquiry Desk looking for the ‘status’ of a document, here is some guidance that may be helpful.

Once you have found the listing for your document (either through the ‘search’ function or via the document library), hover over the item you are interested in and you should see a down arrow appear to the left – example below:

Clicking ‘View Properties’ in the document library or ‘View Details’ in the search results will forward you to a page which contains information associated with the document (eg:

- Status of a document, Synopsis, Issue date, associated documents such as Briefing Notes, Deviations etc) as shown in Image 2 below.

If you have any further questions relating to standards documentation please contact the Enquiry Desk on 020 3142 5400 or email enquirydesk@rssb.co.uk

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New Railway Group Standard for TPWS Driver/Machine interface

TPWS has made a significant contribution to the reduction in SPAD risk since its introduction in 2003. Nevertheless, the occurrence of 'reset and continue' incidents following a SPAD has continued to be a cause of concern.

A reset-and-continue event occurs where the driver of a train that has been brought to a standstill by TPWS intervention, for a number of reasons, resets the system and proceeds to drive the train forward.

A possible explanation for reset and continue is that the information currently provided to the driver in the case of a TPWS or AWS intervention does not differentiate between the different potential causes of a brake application – a TPWS train stop (indicating that a SPAD has occurred), a TPWS overspeed trip, or delay in acknowledging an AWS caution. A working group led by ATOC considered potential solutions for addressing reset and continue. Analysis of the options supported the introduction of a modified TPWS Driver-Machine Interface (DMI) to be specified for new trains which would provide the driver with a clear indication of the cause of a brake application.

The design of the modified TPWS DMI has been incorporated into a revised version of Railway Group Standard GE/RT8030. Issue 3 of this standard, to be published in April 2010, includes an additional appendix which gives a detailed specification for the revised DMI. This will provide three separate indications to identify the cause of a brake demand – ‘SPAD’, ‘Overspeed’ or ‘AWS’ – and the particular indication has to be specifically acknowledged by the driver before the brakes can be released. Voice alerts will also be incorporated for ‘SPAD’ and ‘Overspeed’ incidents.

The modified DMI will be mandated for new trains. Mandatory fitment of a modified design of TPWS DMI to existing trains was not demonstrated to be justified, and it will therefore be a decision for individual railway undertakings whether to incorporate a similar change on existing trains or to mitigate the risk of reset and continue in other ways.

The revision to the Railway Group Standard was led by RSSB under the guidance of a drafting group comprising representatives from across the industry, and was reviewed and approved by a Multifunctional Standards Committee.

This change to the TPWS DMI implements one of the proposals incorporated in the TPWS Strategy published in December 2009, which is available on the RSSB website at http://www.rssb.co.uk/safety/safety_strategies/TPWS%20Strategy.asp.

Reducing the likelihood of incidents at maintenance depots

The rail industry faces challenging issues managing human factors risks and improving the reliability of operations at maintenance depots. In September 2009, the RSSB Human Factors Team was commissioned by a company to undertake a review of operations at one of their maintenance depots. This review was requested in response to the occurrence of a number of derailments and near miss incidents at the depot.

This review investigated the human factors issues that contributed to the incidents and provided a set of related recommendations to reduce the risks and to improve the reliability of operations. The results will help stakeholders across the rail industry to seek continuous improvements in the safety of those working at depots. The benefits are expected to flow from reduced accidents, reduced expense from derailment damage, and better availability of rolling stock.

A number of techniques were used to complete the review, including an error classification analysis of incident investigation reports, data collection visits to the depot during the day and night-time, a review of the method of work, interviews with staff and an analysis of roster arrangements.

The review identified that the ability of the depot to provide a safe and reliable service is challenged by a number of issues in train movements around the depot. These issues have been influenced by a significant increase in the number of units being serviced at the depot in recent years. It was found that all incidents occurred in the evening or at night when the depot was operating at full capacity. A number of underlying causes were identified relating to workload which is particularly high on night shifts between the hours of 21:00 and 02:00. The review delivered a number of immediate and longer-term recommendations to mitigate human error, improve rostering arrangements and the competence management system, and communicate advice on fatigue management to shift workers. It was also recommended that the safety critical communication protocols and the method of work be clarified and the company should consider using the RSSB safety culture improvement toolkit to assess the safety culture at the depot.
RSSB has received positive feedback from the company in response to the review of operations at the maintenance depot. A number of the recommendations have been actioned already and incorporated into the company's business plan.

For further information, contact Siân Evans, human factors specialist at sian.evans@rssb.co.uk

GK/RT0045 Lineside Signals, Indicators and Layout of Lineside Signals

RSSB published GK/RT0045 issue 1 in February 2010. This new railway group standard defines the format, presentation and layout of lineside signalling equipment that is used to display movement authority information to train crew and train dispatchers. It replaces GK/RT0031 and GK/RT0032, which were withdrawn at the same time.

Whilst the key objective of this standards project has been to identify the requirements that do not require co-operation at the duty holder interface and transfer them to the appropriate owner, the opportunity has been taken to take account of recent changes and developments. GK/RT0045 includes new material to address:

- Lineside indications provided with ERTMS level 2 (without signals)
- 3-state banner repeating signals (green banners)

GK/RT0045 also addresses more than sixty derogations and temporary non-compliances raised since 2005, which should make it easier in the future for signalling projects to comply.

As with all new Railway Group Standards in the Control Command and Signalling area, an accompanying guidance note GK/GN0645 has also been published, which sets out the rationale for each measure and describes existing good practice where appropriate. This is intended to help signalling projects understand why it is necessary to comply with GK/RT0045 and, where a proposal for deviation is considered necessary, develop the evidence to justify an alternative solution.

If you would like more information please contact Richard Barrow, ccs engineer on 020 3142 5536 or email richard.barrow@rssb.co.uk

GK/RT0192 Level Crossing Interface Requirements

RSSB published GK/RT0192 issue 1 in February 2010. This new Railway Group Standard defines the requirements for level crossing systems at the interface between the infrastructure manager and railway undertakings. It replaces GI/RT07012 which is withdrawn at the same time.

The key objective of this standards project has been to identify the requirements that do not require co-operation at the duty holder interface and transfer them to the appropriate owner. As a consequence, GK/RT0192 is substantially smaller than GI/RT07012, which it replaces, because level crossing functionality is largely the sole responsibility of the infrastructure manager.

The scope of GK/RT0045 describes the required behaviour of level crossing systems in terms of the interface with railway undertakings, including the requirements for protecting signals, level crossing indications, level crossing telephones and any relevant controls provided for local operation by train crew.

As with all new Railway Group Standards in the Control Command and Signalling area, an accompanying guidance note GK/GN0692 has also been published, which considers necessary, develop the evidence to justify an alternative solution.

If you would like more information please contact Richard Barrow, ccs engineer on 020 3142 5536 or email richard.barrow@rssb.co.uk

For further information on any of RSSB’s products and services please contact the RSSB ENQUIRY DESK ON 020 3142 5400 OR ENQUIRYDESK@RSSB.CO.UK
New Approach to the Rule Book

Under the leadership of RSSB the industry is embarking on an ambitious project to transform the content and presentation of the rules currently published in the Rule Book (GE/RT8000).

The latest information on this project can be viewed at http://www.rssb.co.uk/new_approach.asp

Neil MacDonald joins RSSB Board

When Keith Heller retired from DB Schenker Rail his position became vacant on the RSSB Board. Consequently, Neil McDonald, Managing Director of DB Schenker Rail (UK) Ltd (Industrial Segment) has just been appointed industry non-executive director on the RSSB Board for a 3-year term, representing Freight Operators.

Neil brings to the position a wealth of experience. Neil joined the railway industry in 1979 as an Engineering Apprentice and worked in engineering roles across Scotland moving to South Wales in the mid 1990’s to manage Cardiff Canton freight engineering maintenance depot. Neil held various senior positions within EWS including Regional Engineer at Toton. Head of Maintenance Strategy & Planning and General Manager Maintenance, responsible for the overall maintenance and overhaul requirements of EWS’s fleet of locomotives and wagons.

In 2006, Neil was appointed as Managing Director of EWS Industrial (now DB Schenker Industrial), a £100m business serving the metal and petroleum markets.

Professor Helen Muir OBE

In February 2010 Professor Helen Muir tendered her resignation from the chair of the CIRAS Committee due to ill health. After a short but courageous fight against cancer, she died on 20 March.

Helen had been involved with CIRAS since its inception. She advised ScotRail on the establishment of a confidential reporting system which was intended initially for train drivers. That advice included using a local supplier and this led to Strathclyde University setting up the scheme. From that limited beginning in 1996, the system soon grew in scope and was launched across the national network in 2000.

Until her resignation, Helen was the chair of the steering groups for CIRAS. Although known under various titles and with different compositions due to a series of reorganisations, Helen was always involved and at the helm. She has been a source of wise counsel on the development and operation of the system. Her involvement from a respected position outside the industry has given credibility to CIRAS and she has been able to give reliable verification of the robustness of the processes and the strong emphasis on maintaining high standards of performance and confidentiality.

As an interim measure, Chris Green will deputise as chair of the committee whilst a search is in progress to identify a respected high profile individual from outside the industry to become the new permanent chair.