1. **Purpose**

1.1 This is the final paper in the fifth year of the Strategic Board Agenda. It shows how the board has considered 100% of the modelled safety risk for the industry along with some other business risks and opportunities. It considers the completeness of the process relating to safety risk and discusses the strategic agenda from April 2013.

2. **Background**

2.1 During the course of the year the board has considered a number of strategic papers and presentations on the main elements of system risk¹, as listed below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Meeting</th>
<th>Paper 1</th>
<th>Paper 2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>May 2012</td>
<td>RDG relationship with RSSB and RSSB future strategy</td>
<td>Role of the board in the review of risk</td>
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<tr>
<td>July 2012</td>
<td>Workforce Risk</td>
<td>R&amp;D Review of 2011/12 and implementation and RSSB Strategic review</td>
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<tr>
<td>September 2012</td>
<td>Public Risk</td>
<td>RSSB Strategic Review, Review of Sustainable Rail Programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>November 2012</td>
<td>Passenger Risk</td>
<td>Train Accident Risk, RSSB Strategic Review and Budget 2013/2014</td>
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<tr>
<td>January 2013</td>
<td>Strategic Risk Review</td>
<td>RSSB Strategic Review</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 2013</td>
<td>Annual risk review</td>
<td>RSSB Strategic Review</td>
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2.2 Each meeting considered a system safety item (together comprising full coverage of the risk to passengers, workforce and members of the public), stewardship reports from cross industry groups that RSSB facilitates, and other areas of business risk and opportunity where RSSB facilitates cross industry working.

3. **System safety risk - review of 2012/13**

3.1 Figure 1 summarises the system safety risk areas covered by the Strategic Board Agenda papers. As defined by RSSB’s Safety Risk Model Version 7 (SRM v7), the board considered 100% of the modelled residual risk on the mainline railway through the three papers on passenger, workforce, and public risk. In the paper on train accident risk, the board focussed on the PIM, which covers 86% of train accident risk.

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¹ Covering safety, performance and efficiency
² Also included the Industry Safety Meeting - Change developments currently underway in the industry
Each of the risk papers focussed on particular areas of risk within the category under discussion represented by the darker shades in Figure 1. Risk areas represented by lighter shades for the three person types were covered in appendices, which showed all of the risk from the SRM, including summaries of how industry and RSSB address all risk areas. Therefore although the train accident risk paper looked only at PIM coverage, other sources of train accident risk will have been implicitly covered in the other three papers. Each of the individual risk papers included a table showing the RSSB projects, industry cooperative actions and duty holder actions are undertaken to understand and manage the risk in each risk area. Together these show how the industry is managing the safety risk defined by the SRM.

3.3 In general the attention paid to each risk has been proportionate, and the board noted that the arrangements in place for duty holders, or collectively through RSSB or cross industry groups, are adequate to address the relevant risks. Where system issues were remitted to RSSB or relevant cross industry groups the actions identified have been noted in minutes and subsequent board papers.

4. **Strategic risk review**

During the discussion on the Annual Risk Review paper in March 2012 the board agreed that they should take time out from their normal agenda to look forward strategically at the system risk profile and identify if there are any factors/issues, from the board’s perspective, that could affect the risk profile in the coming years and consider if adequate understanding and/or mitigations are in place to manage the identified factors and give their overall view on the trend in risk for each risk area.

This activity was started at the January board meeting and work will continue to determine the actions, if any, around each key issue that are necessary to ensure that
adequate consideration is given to their implications and to minimise the potential risk.

5. **Progress on risk during 2011/12.**

5.1 **HLOS Safety Metrics** - The SRM has recently been updated to Version 7.5 to account for changes in the frequency and/or consequences of the movement and non-movement accident risk categories. The train accident modelling has remained unchanged. Based on v7.5 the HLOS safety metrics have been re-calculated.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>HLOS Safety Metrics</th>
<th>Passenger FWI / billion passenger km</th>
<th>Workforce FWI / million workforce hours</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>v6.6 (March 09)</td>
<td>0.996</td>
<td>0.135</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>v7.5 (December 12)</td>
<td>0.940</td>
<td>0.123</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% change</td>
<td>-5.6%</td>
<td>-8.8%</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

The results show that both the passenger and workforce HLOS safety metrics are ahead of the requirement to reduce both risk areas by 3% by the end of CP4.

5.2 **Strategic Safety Plan Trajectories** - At the end of September 2012 performance in 11 of the 15 trajectories set out in the 2009-2014 SSP currently satisfies the trajectory, with varying levels of stability. For four of the 15 SSP trajectories, current performance is not within the trajectory. These trajectories relate to passenger risk at the platform-train interface, passenger injuries on board trains, infrastructure failure and trespass; it is noted that passenger on board trains and trespass are only marginally outside the trajectory.

5.3 **Train accident risk** - At the end of December 2012, the overall Precursor Indicator Model (PIM) measure stood at 94.6, compared with 82.6 at the end of December 2011, and the PIM contribution relevant to passenger risk stood at 45.7, compared with 34 at the end of December 2011. The benchmark level for the passenger PIM at September 2006 was 45.1. The largest PIM contributor to passenger risk is infrastructure failures, followed by irregular working and SPADs. The increase in the PIM contribution from infrastructure failures was largely due to the increase in landslips from adverse weather seen in 2012. This was discussed in detail in the November train accident risk paper.

5.4 **Data quality** – the quality of the safety related event data reported into SMIS by the industry was maintained during 2012 based on the RSSB data quality healthchecks.

6. **Key safety risk management initiatives considered in 2012/13**

6.1 **The station safety improvement project** - This is an OFG sponsored initiative to raise awareness of the safety issues that exist at stations on the GB mainline railway network and to promote good practice amongst the station operator community. Focus is being given to the risk at the platform train interface particularly in light of the RAIB recommendations relating to the 2011 James Street accident.
6.2 Close call version 2 – Close call reporting has been identified as being an important means of understanding potential precursors to risk before accidents occur. Version 2 of the close call system was launched in October 2012 and Network Rail has made its use mandatory for all of its principal contractors.

6.3 Road driving risk - This RSSB supported industry initiative is looking at the risk from road vehicle driving that affects most rail companies. The initiative seeks to develop reliable arrangements for reporting and analysing road traffic accident events and provide a resource centre on road driving risk to help rail managers to understand and share good practice and continually raise awareness. More details are provided in agenda Item 4.

6.4 Modernisation of safety cooperation - Recent developments including Network Rail route devolution, the development of alliances, the new approach to TOC franchising and the “Rail Value for Money” study, coupled with the safety regulatory regime have provided an opportunity to modernise and improve the approach to the cooperative management of system safety. A national freight safety group has been established and the System Safety Risk Group is being formed. RSSB will be working with these groups to provide them with the safety performance and risk information that they require.

7. Other strategic risks and opportunities?

7.1 European Fourth Railway Package proposes a number of legislation changes, including changes to the Railway Safety Directive – see agenda item 9.

8. Strategic agenda for 2013/14

8.1 It is proposed that the strategic board agenda structure remains the same for the early part of 2013/14 and that the role of the board and its agenda are included as part of the considerations in the RSSB strategic review.

9. Completeness of review

9.1 The executive and members of RSSB staff have reviewed the risks covered in both safety and strategic non safety areas and consider that overall the company has considered and reported on the most significant risk and opportunity areas where RSSB can support the industry, in both the safety and business risk areas.

10. Recommendations

10.1 The board is asked to;

- **CONFIRM** that they are content that during the year they have reviewed and considered the significant items of system safety risk that impact on the industry and are satisfied with the overall arrangements.

- **CONFIRM** that they are content that during the year they have reviewed and considered the other strategic risks and opportunities which face the industry where there are RSSB supporting activities, and that they are satisfied with the arrangements RSSB has in hand.