1. **Purpose**

1.1 To provide board members for information, with a copy of the 2013/14 public safety risk paper and the main discussion points arising from its review at the System Safety Risk Group (SSRG) on 09 September 2014.

1.2 To provide board members with an update on the proposal for the production of the risk papers for 2015.

1.3 To endorse SSRG proposals to address trespass risk.

2. **Background**

2.1 The RSSB board remitted the SSRG to produce, review and publish the three risk papers on public, passenger and workforce risk annually.

2.2 Following review by SSRG, the board requested to see each of these risk papers for information.

3. **Public risk paper**

3.1 SSRG received the 2013/14 public risk paper at the 09 September 2014 meeting and a final copy is attached as Annex A.

3.2 A record of the SSRG discussion on this paper is included in Annex B. The main highlights were:

- Statistical significance is not clearly shown within the paper or on the charts.
- It would be useful to tie in previous initiatives to risk reduction and consider what the impact of new initiatives would be on future risk reduction.
- There is need to develop suitable arrangements to address trespass risk - refer to Section 5.

3.3 SSRG members agreed that the public risk paper should be accepted in its current format for this year but asked that the comments recorded in the minutes were taken into account during the preparation of the equivalent 2015 paper.

4. **Risk papers for 2015**

4.1 A schedule for the 2015 risk papers was tabled as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Meeting</th>
<th>Papers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>March 2015</td>
<td>Risk to passengers, workforce and members of the public in stations or on trains (PTSRG)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Month</td>
<td>Risk Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 2015</td>
<td>Risk to infrastructure workers under remit of Network Rail / ISLG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Risk to the workforce under remit of NR / single duty holder</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Risk from road driving on duty (Road Driving Risk Project)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 2015</td>
<td>Risk at level crossings (LCSG)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Risk from train accidents (TORG)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 2015</td>
<td>Risk from suicide (NSPSG)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Risk from lineside trespass and other accident public injuries not covered by other groups</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4.2 SSRG agreed to the proposal to combine both the stewardship update and the risk update into one paper, noting that a stewardship paper for SSRG and DRSG would also need to be included into the schedule.

5. **Trespass**

5.1 SSRG held a workshop on 17 October 2014 to discuss the current arrangements for lineside trespass risk with the chairs of its specialist risk groups and other key industry players (including British Transport Police).

5.2 The workshop considered the following:

   - Definition of trespass (see note ¹) and themes
   - Risk including safety, reputation, prosecution and performance impact
   - What is currently being done and by whom to address

5.3 Following this review, SSRG agreed that significant efforts are being undertaken to address, however good practice is not being shared, activities are not being coordinated and there is no overall strategy. In response, SSRG agreed to establish a small project team to undertake an assessment of the current position, develop proposals for improvement and make suitable recommendations. This work is to commence immediately.

6. **Recommendations**

6.1 The board is:

   - Invited to read the public risk paper and **NOTE** the SSRG discussion and use as appropriate.
   - **NOTE** the proposal for the 2015 risk papers and the provisional schedule for production.

---

¹ Any person who trespasses on any railway lines, sidings, railway embankments, tunnels or similar works belonging to, leased to or worked by the British Railways Board, London Regional Transport or their successors by virtue of Schedule 27 to the Transport Act 2000 in close proximity to such lines, other works or to any electrical apparatus used in connection with the railway.
1. Purpose
1.1 The purpose of this paper is to provide SSRG members with a review of public risk and safety performance up to the end of the 2013/14 financial year and present emerging trends for 2014/15. The paper presents a number of key safety performance measures for public risk and specific areas of risk currently being tackled by industry groups.

2. Key points
- Number of public fatalities highest ever recorded
- Currently no industry group considering lineside trespass
- Reduction in level crossing risk/harm over CP4
- Level crossing misuse terminology questioned by Transport Select Committee
- New BTP data enables re-categorisation of trespass data
- 6000 staff trained to identify and manage individuals intending to commit suicide and in 2013/14, the BTP recorded 631 potential lifesaving interventions
- The safety and operational performance risk from vandalism continues to reduce

3. Public accidental risk profile
3.1 The latest revision of the safety risk model (SRMv8.1) includes a partial update of trespass and suicide-related hazardous events to take into account new information that British Transport Police (BTP) has made available about specific fatalities.

3.2 SRMv8.1 estimates the accidental risk to members of the public as being 47.5 FWI per year, which is 36% of the total system risk of 132.0 FWI (excluding suicides):

- Trespass accounts for 70% (33.3 FWI) of risk to members of the public.
- Level crossing risk accounts for 22% (10.3 FWI); pedestrians struck by trains 14% (6.5 FWI) and road vehicle occupants 7% (3.3 FWI).
- Accidents away from level crossings and not involving trespass account for 8% (3.9 FWI) of the risk. A detailed breakdown of the risk profile is shown in Chart 1 in the Appendix.

4. Overview of trends in 2013/14
4.1 At 308, the number of fatalities to members of the public in 2013/14 was the highest recorded.

---

2 The definition of public is for people who do not intend to travel by train as passengers, those who trespass on the infrastructure or those who are affected by the railway in some way, for example, level crossing users.
4.2 The number of accidental public fatalities due to trespass was 22\(^3\) in 2013/14, compared with 31 in 2012/13. Over the past five years, the average number of trespass fatalities has been 31. (See Chart 3.)

4.3 Seven of the fatalities were members of the public at level crossings: two were occupants of the same road vehicle, who died when their car was involved in a collision with a train and five (including one cyclist) were pedestrian users of footpath crossings. The total level of harm at level crossings was 7.7 FWI. (See Chart 4.)

4.4 Since 2004/05, there has been an average of 12 collisions per year between trains and road vehicles at level crossings. There were ten such incidents during 2013/14, and there is some evidence that the underlying rate of train collisions with road vehicles at level crossings has reduced over the past ten years. (See Chart 5.)

4.5 The number of public fatalities due to suicide or suspected suicide was 279, compared with 247 in 2012/13. Over the past five years, the average number of suicide/suspected suicide fatalities has been 246. Although suicides on the railway represent by far the largest proportion of railway-related fatalities, they represent a relatively small percentage of suicides on a national level. (See Chart 6/7.)

4.6 Over the past ten years, the trend in reported vandalism has fallen by 63%. All types of vandalism have seen reductions over this period, although it is the incidence of missile-throwing and line obstructions that have seen the greatest decreases, and have driven the overall reduction over the decade as whole. (See Chart 8.)

5. Current industry groups that review risk to members of the public

5.1 Chart 2 of the Appendix presents public risk broken down by its SSRG sub-group. There is currently no owning group for trespass and other accidental public injuries that occur away from trains, stations or level crossings. An SSRG workshop, scheduled for October, will discuss the management of this area of risk, which amounts to 20.5 FWI per year (43% of the total public accidental risk profile).

5.2 The Level Crossing Strategy Group (LCSG) covers 22% (10.3 FWI) of accidental risk to members of the public. It meets on an eight-weekly basis and its terms of reference (TOR) include reviewing the risk to users of level crossings and train occupants. Some of the group’s objectives include; reviewing current control arrangements and risk mitigations in place, to sponsor and govern research, learning and promotion of good practice/co-operation and responding to SSRG.

5.3 The People on Trains and Stations Risk Group (PTSRG) covers 34% (16.0 FWI) of accidental risk to members of the public. It meets on an eight-weekly basis and its TORs are similar to the LCSG noted above. The scope for members of the public includes injuries; occurring in stations, resulting from trespass, assault and other crime and anti-social behaviour, train dispatch and platform-train interface and slips, trips and falls on railway infrastructure.

5.4 The Train Operations Risk Group (TORG) covers around 1% of accidental risk to members of public. These include people who are involved in collisions with trains with the risk being

---

\(^3\) Since the publication of the 2013/14 ASPR at the end of June 2014, there have been minor amendments to the number of suicide and trespass fatalities: this is due to more information on fatality events becoming available.
dominated by trains striking road vehicles which have ended up on the line as a result of a vehicle incursion (other than at level crossings).

5.5 The remaining risk to members of the public is not accidental as it relates to suicide. The National Suicide Prevention Steering Group (NSPSG) and Working Group (NSPWG) have been in existence since 2010 and are both chaired by Network Rail on behalf of the rail industry. The Steering Group acts as a forum to represent and deliver the industry’s approach to suicide prevention on the network. Its objectives are to prevent suicides on the network and mitigate against their impact on staff and customers through a joint approach with BTP, Samaritans, TOCs, ATOC, RSSB and the unions.

5.6 Network Rail has developed relationships with cross-industry stakeholders including the BTP and the Highways Agency as part of the Fusion Intelligence Unit and through the National Cable Theft Steering Group (NCTSG). Cable theft has seen a fall in the last two years and this has been bought about by industry initiatives. Evidence of this is seen in the cost and delay figures which have come down from £16.4m in 2010/11 to £3.5m in 2013/14. There has been an 81% reduction in delay minutes over the same period.

6. **Other relevant initiatives and information**

**Level crossings**

6.1 The continued improvement in the quality of census data a level crossings will allow for more detailed risk assessments to take place. Network Rail plan to have in place a national target to gain at least a 24hr census for each level crossing by 2016. The deployment of census equipment will assist with the remote / automatic collection and processing of data (including cameras which capture deliberate misuse of individual crossings). This evidence can be used in narrative risk assessments and also assists with more targeted education campaigns for specific users. The emerging results would also be useful to the T936 work on changes to the All Level Crossing Risk Model (ALCRM) when it is re-launched.

6.2 Network Rail use the Level Crossing Risk Indicator model (LCRIM) to measure risk on a periodic basis. Network Rail has been successful in CP4 at reaching and their target of a reduction of risk of 25% using this model. The SRM shows a 13% reduction in risk when CP4 is compared with CP3. There has also been an observed reduction of 33% in the normalised level of harm at level crossings over the same control periods.

6.3 The definition of ‘misuse’ was raised at the House of Commons Transport Select Committee, which met towards the end of 2013, to discuss safety at level crossings. The committee wrote a report in March 2014 which expressed concern that the word ‘misuse’ does not differentiate between wilful negligence (such as jumping barriers- deliberate misuse) and situations that impair human decision-making (such as being unable to see the railway boundary clearly- an accident). A paper was produced and discussed at the 17 July LCSG meeting which detailed a proposal for new industry terminology relating to level crossings. It was agreed that ORR, RSSB and Network Rail would jointly agree use of terminology and their proposal would be reported to a subsequent SSRG meeting.

6.4 The Global Level Crossing Safety and Trespass Prevention Symposium was held in Illinois from 3-8 August 2014. Papers considered a wide range of topics covering: driver behaviour,
grade separation, crossing improvements, accident investigation and response, suicide and trespass prevention and risk analysis. Network Rail and RSSB attended the symposium and gave presentations\(^5\). The conference concluded with launch of a global “Dumb ways to die\(^6\)” campaign – through singing for safety. Countries are encouraged to get involved in delivering a safety message by inviting staff and members of the public to video themselves singing the song, “Dumb ways to die”, to aid with the creation of an international montage. Support (including merchandise) will be made available to countries interested in taking part. LCSG to consider if GB railways should be involved.

6.5 The International Level Crossing Awareness Day (ILCAD) is a joint commitment continuing from the success of the first European Level Crossing Awareness Day held in 2009. ILCAD is now celebrated in 45 countries, raising public awareness on the safety factors and dangers posed by misbehaviour at level crossings. This year’s theme was ‘Professional Drivers’ and was held on 3 June\(^7\).

**Trespass**

6.6 Throughout 2013/14, a greater amount of information about fatalities related to trespass and suicide was made available by BTP to the industry, through the enhanced co-operation taking place under the NSPWG. The Suicide Prevention and Mental Health team within BTP was established and has worked with Network Rail and RSSB to look at classification of fatalities. As part of this partnership, BTP have been able to share more information on railway fatalities, going back to 2009/10 with no available data before this date. This has enabled the industry to review a number of cases where the coroners’ verdict is not yet returned, or is recorded as open or narrative, and re-assess them against the Ovenstone criteria.

6.7 The new partnership between Network Rail and The Football League Trust (FLT) will see 10 clubs work with Network Rail’s community safety managers to boost awareness of railway safety. The initiative is a development of Network Rail’s Rail Life programme which has successfully worked with schools and community groups to get across safety messages in fun and engaging ways. Network Rail has also provided education material to schools that are situated adjacent to level crossings and produced video material to explain the risks to children. In 2013/14 there were no fatalities to children involved in trespass.

6.8 The Community Safety Communications Group has been renamed the Community Safety Forum Steering Group (CSFSG) and its remit changed to reflect the sole aim of organising and delivering the annual community safety forum. This year’s forum was held on the 20 March and was attended by 67 people from 33 different organisations. The presentations are available to view on the Community Safety Resource Centre (CSRC) website\(^8\). A small number of Network Rail Community Safety Partnership Groups (CSPG) still meet to discuss community safety, however, a number of routes have new arrangements including route system safety or route crime sub-groups or panels. The CSPGs were set up to develop and deliver local level action plans aimed at reducing the risks and costs posed by crime, disorder and other forms of inappropriate public behaviour - including trespass, vandalism, graffiti, assaults, suicides and level crossing user behaviour.

---

\(^5\) Presentations can be found at [http://railtec.illinois.edu/GLXS/presentations.php](http://railtec.illinois.edu/GLXS/presentations.php)

\(^6\) Click on the link to see the video of “dumb ways to die”: [http://dumbwaystodie.com/](http://dumbwaystodie.com/)

\(^7\) More information on ILCAD can be found at: [http://www.ilcad.org/ILCAD-2014.html](http://www.ilcad.org/ILCAD-2014.html)

\(^8\) Registration required: [http://www.railcommunitysafety.com/Communications/Pages/Forum.aspx](http://www.railcommunitysafety.com/Communications/Pages/Forum.aspx)
Suicides

6.9 Network Rail and the Samaritans joint programme on reducing the impact of suicides on the railways began in 2010 and will continue through CP5. As part of the programme, the managing suicidal contacts training course has provided over 6,000 staff with the skills and knowledge on how to deal with vulnerable people. A learning tool is also being developed to brief to staff which consists of a 30 minute DVD to provide an overview of the programme and equip the viewer with basic skills to intervene in a suicide attempt. The tool will be released at the 2nd annual suicide conference in October. During 2013/14, the BTP recorded 631 potential lifesaving interventions as a result of which 416 people were detained under the mental health act. RSSB has asked the industry to record suicide interventions in SMIS and since July 2013 there have been 412 recorded.

6.10 The first evaluation of the R&D project T845 Improving suicide prevention measures on the rail network in Great Britain focused on evaluating the Network Rail / Samaritans programme that was implemented to reduce the number of suicides on the rail network. The findings of the project can be found in the Appendix. T845 is now completed a follow-on R&D project to T845 has now been submitted called R627 Continuing the evaluation of the national rail suicide prevention programme. This will evaluate the continuation of the programme and will look at the activities that are beneficial, and should be continued, and the activities that are not beneficial and should be stopped. In the development of R627 it has highlighted that a number of activities cannot be evaluated using statistical analysis as there isn’t enough data available, it is proposed that these activities be evaluated using qualitative research instead. By having these two types of approach to the evaluation it should indicate the activities that are, and are not, working in reducing suicides on the network.

6.11 Network Rail has a contractual relationship with BTP which has provided data for analysis of suicides such as geospatial mapping and information about the profile of suicidal persons. The working group has also been trialling engineering methods such as physical measures to prevent access to the railway with the routes taking more responsibility for their own local risks.

6.12 When comparing railway suicides with national suicide figures (see Chart 7) the national figures saw a decline until 2007, however in 2009 a 6.5% increase was seen and sustained till 2011. This is equivalent to 7950 more suicides if previous trends had continued. A study published by the British Journal of Psychiatry has suggested that the economic crisis in Europe and North America led to these extra suicides. The study found that not all countries were affected by an increased suicide rate especially where investments were made to help vulnerable groups.

Vandalism

6.13 Over the past ten years, the trend in reported vandalism has fallen by 63% (see Chart 8). The reduction in seasonal volatility has been driven by the overall reduction in other vandalism (including cable theft), obstructions on the line and missiles thrown during the peak periods around April. Conversely, the troughs have not altered as much in the six years prior to the fourth quarter of 2013/14 and could be explained by:

---

9 The following groups that reported these were TOCs: 169, BTP: 61 and Network Rail: 57.
10 http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/health-27796628
11 Includes return to work schemes, training advice and subsidised wages.
- BTP targeting hotpots and improving response times when a crime is taking place. Increasing surveillance cameras which can act as a deterrent to perpetrators and are also used to prosecute offenders.

- The ongoing education (in school) and youth club (not in school) programmes, although it is very difficult to measure their effectiveness.

- BTP increasing their patrols around Easter school holidays (coinciding with lighter evenings) as historically there has been an increase in trespass. These increased patrols may have acted to reduce other crimes.

- Reduction in cable thefts since 2011 due to the specific work Network Rail and BTP were involved in and directly relates to the observed reduction in other vandalism.

6.14 Derailments due to vandalism are rare (1%) although a derailment did occur recently when a train struck an obstruction in Inverkeilor, Scotland in 2012. During the last ten years, nine fatalities\(^{12}\) are known to have occurred to members of the public who had been involved in theft/damage; five were graffiti related and four were involved in cable theft. The most recent fatality due to cable theft was in June 2012 on the line between Benfleet and Leigh-on-Sea. In May 2013 a man suffered major injuries with 30% burns and a fractured vertebrae after receiving an electric shock from overhead line equipment in Ilford. It is believed he was trespassing in the act of cable theft.

7. **Recommendation**

7.1 SSRG are invited to:

- **a)** **CONSIDER** and **DISCUSS** the key points identified in this paper.
- **b)** **CONFIRM** that they are content that they have reviewed and considered the significant items of public safety risk that impact on the industry and are satisfied with the overall arrangements to control the risk.

\(^{12}\) There was also one minor injury and eight major injuries due to the same causes over the period.
Appendix 1: Public risk performance

Chart 1. Public risk by accident type (excludes suicides)

- Chart 1 shows the proportion of risk to members of the public on the left hand pie chart as being 47.5 FWI per year, which is 36% of the total system risk of 132.0 FWI (excludes suicides).

- The right hand pie chart then shows the accident type and shows that accidental trespass accounts for most of the risk to members of the public (41% not related to stations/trains and 29% related to stations/trains (total 33.3 FWI)).

- Accidents at level crossings involving the public show pedestrians struck by trains at level crossings account for 14% (6.5 FWI), with train collisions with road vehicles contributing to 7% (3.3 FWI). The other remaining risk at level crossings is 1% (0.5 FWI) and includes people falling over and people being hit with barriers at level crossings.

- A small proportion (1%; 0.7 FWI) of the risk to the public covers the risk from train collisions with road vehicles not at level crossings (ie vehicle incursions) and the lesser risk to third parties from other train accidents, such as derailments or collisions (eg Potters Bar where a member of the public was struck by debris from a bridge following a derailment).

- The remaining 7% (3.2 FWI) of public risk - which does not result from trespass, train accidents, or level crossing usage - mainly results from accidents to people who are in stations, but not for the purposes of travel. It includes the types of events seen in the passenger risk profile: slips, trips and falls, falls from the platform edge, and assault.

Source: SRMv8.1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sub-group</th>
<th>Risk</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Passenger</td>
<td>47.5</td>
<td>36%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Workforce</td>
<td>26.1</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trespass related to stations/trains</td>
<td>19.6</td>
<td>41%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trespass not related to stations/trains</td>
<td>13.6</td>
<td>28%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other injuries to members of the public</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other train accidents</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Train collisions with road vehicles at LX</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public pedestrians struck by train at LX</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other public accidents at LX</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Chart 2. Public risk profile by sub-group
- Chart 2 presents public risk broken down by its SSRG sub-group.

- The grey area on the right hand side of the chart shows the trespass risk that is not being considered by a sub-group (43% 20.5 FWI).
Through the enhanced co-operation taking place under the National Suicide Prevention Working Group, BTP have been able to share more information on railway fatalities, going back to 2009/10. For this reason, caution must be taken when comparing the second half of the past ten years with the first five years.

The average level of harm to members of the public over the period 2009/10 to 2013/14 was 52.5 FWI per year. Most of the fall in the level of harm in 2013/14 was due to the lower number of trespass fatalities (22 was the lowest total recorded in the past five years).

There have been four level crossing fatalities in Quarter 1 2014/15; one involving road vehicle occupant and one motorcyclist and two pedestrians (one cyclist). The two pedestrian fatalities occurred on the same level crossing at Wharf Road nearly one month apart 31 May and 26 June 2014.
Chart 4. Harm at level crossings (excluding suicides)

- Chart 4 shows the ten fiscal years including Q1 to July 2014 and shows 100 fatalities on level crossings, excluding suicides. This figure comprises 69 pedestrians (including six passengers using station crossings), 25 road vehicle users and the six train occupants who died in the collision at Ufton in 2004.

Chart 5. Level crossing collisions

- There is some evidence that the underlying rate of collisions at level crossings has reduced over the past ten years. By grouping the decade into two five-year periods shows a notable reduction in the number of collisions from 75 to 48.
Chart 6. Trends in suicides split by confirmed and suspected suicides

- Chart 6 presents the trespass and suicide fatalities for the past ten years. The dark bars represent the number of events with a coroner’s confirmed verdict (suicide). The light bars represent the number of verdicts that were open or narrative, or have not yet been held. These are based on application of the Ovenstone criteria into those suspected of being suicide.

Chart 7. Railway suicides in wider context
- National suicides are published on calendar basis and approximately two year delay, therefore data in Chart 7 only covers data up to 2012. Over the period shown, the number of national suicides has seen an increasing linear trend. Railway suicides have also been increasing. In 2012, the proportion of the national total occurring on railway property was 4.4%.

**Chart 8. Trends in reported vandalism**

- Chart 8 shows that reported vandalism is seasonal with peaks in April when numbers are nearly twice as many reported in December.
- All types of vandalism shown in the chart have seen reductions over this period, although it is the incidence of missile-throwing and line obstructions that have seen the greatest absolute decreases, and have driven the overall reduction over the decade as whole.
- Cable theft is within the *Other vandalism* category and has seen a fall in the last two years and is now at the lowest level.
T845 Improving suicide prevention measures on the rail network in GB

Project findings:

- Suicide numbers are affected by a number of external factors to the programme.
- Analysis of the costs borne by the industry is estimated to be between £20–40 million per year; the largest element being the delay and cancellation costs paid by Network Rail to the affected TOCs.
- A variety of programme activities have been initiated across the network including, but not limited to, Samaritans posters, physical barriers and increased awareness of suicide.
- There have been reduced response times to suicide, mainly as a result of better co-ordination of responses by the BTP. The mean time in 2010/11 was 2 hours 40 minutes and for the most recent full year (2012/13) this had reduced to 2 hours 08 minutes; a reduction of 32 minutes (20%).
- The delay minutes for 2013/14 were 290,752 which is a reduction from the 2012/13 figure of 299,932.
- It has not been possible to ascertain BTP costs in detail. The 2013/14 BTP budget for National Rail operations is £226 million. If BTP resources occupied in responding to suicides was between 2 and 5% (this figure is an RSSB estimate that is based on information provided by the BTP) of BTP’s total resources this would represent an annual industry cost of between £4.5 and £11 million (this is also a RSSB estimate).
- Trauma Support Training (TST) was developed and started in 2011 and has had a total of 1023 staff trained in the year to date.
- Managing Suicidal Contacts (MSC) training was developed and started in 2010 and a total of 4771 staff have been trained in the year to date.
- MSC training did not have a significant impact on the number of interventions being made but it did affect;
  - staff being able to identify someone who may be suicidal
  - the quality of interventions
  - positive actions following an incident
  - the likelihood of making intervention in the future
- It was found on a national level that the National Suicide Prevention Steering Group (NSPSSG) and National Suicide Prevention Working Group (NSPWG) have been successful in:
  - supporting and promoting partnership working
  - encouraging additional activities that were not originally included in the programme
  - identifying and addressing obstacles to partnership working
  - creating more engagement with other organisations but direct influence on local partnership working is less clear cut.
- It was found at a local level that:
  - the expertise of Samaritans is the most important factor to building and sustaining local partnerships.
  - there is evidence of a cultural shift from reacting to suicide prevention measures.
  - a lack of resources is a barrier to suicide prevention activities.
  - senior buy-in is essential for suicide prevention measures to continue and be maintained.
- Frontline staff want to be involved in the programme and appear to be confused about whether they work in a priority location or not.
- The activities were perceived to be effective in reducing the number of suicides and staff distress although it was not considered a big change.
- There is no evidence of a significant change in the number of railway suicides.
- The demographics and locations of suicides show no significant changes.
- There are still areas for improvement in suicide prevention.
Public risk paper discussion: Extract from the draft 9 September 2014 SSRG minutes

Key to initial used in the minutes:
AC – Andy Cooper, Cross Country (SSRG Chair)
AS – Allan Spence, Network Rail
CD - Colin Dennis, RSSB
DB – Dave Bennett, ASLEF
GB – George Bearfield, RSSB
MB – Martin Brown, TFL
RD – Richard Dean, Southeastern

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>5.0</th>
<th>Public Risk Paper</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5.1</td>
<td><strong>CD</strong> introduced the paper on ‘Public risk’ explaining that it was one of the three risk papers being presented to SSRG over the year. The aim of the paper was to draw out the key points related to public risk that SSRG needs to consider.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| 5.2 | **CD** highlighted the following key points:  
- Number of public fatalities highest ever recorded  
- Currently no industry group considering lineside trespass  
- Reduction in level crossing risk/harm over CP4  
- Level crossing misuse terminology questioned by Transport Select Committee  
- New BTP data enables re-categorisation of trespass data  
- 6000 staff trained to identify and manage individuals intending to commit suicide and in 2013/14, the BTP recorded 631 potential lifesaving interventions  
- The safety and operational performance risk from vandalism continues to reduce  
He added that lots of effort was being made, particularly in the area of suicide. However, the current figures for suicide are looking to be similar to last year.  
**CD** pointed out an error on Chart 6. The Q1 value should be 64 and not 96. |
| 5.3 | In terms of level crossing risk – there was a statistically significant reduction over CP4 compared to CP3. Network Rail has a long term strategy for CP5.  
**AS** explained that Network Rail had closed 80 crossings already in CP5 yet the risk profile had increased. The reason behind this is that there have been big improvements in the usage estimates. New equipment is helping give a more accurate picture of crossing usage. Other novel solutions such as the use of Automatic full barriers are also being explored. |
| 5.4 | **MB** stated that the areas where there was statistical significance were not clearly shown within the paper or on the charts. He also requested that future papers make more of an attempt to tie previous initiatives to risk reduction and consider what the impact of new initiatives would be on future risk reduction.  
**AS** gave an example. On chart 5, showing level crossing collisions, there had been a recent initiative on AOCL crossings and this has had a positive impact on the numbers.  
**CD** said that the new format for the risk papers going forward would give an opportunity to make improvements and that these comments would be fed into the process and also discussed at the workshop in October. **CD/GB agreed to investigate how statistical significance could be incorporated into the paper/charts and make more of an attempt to tie previous initiatives to risk reduction and consider what the impact of new initiatives would be on future risk reduction [ACTION]** |

CD/GB
| 5.5 | **DB** commented that although the number of suicides was high; if the number of interventions was considered then they could have been a lot higher if nothing had been done. |
| 5.6 | **RD** commented on bullet point two on page 28: *The grey area on the right hand side of the chart shows the trespass risk that is not being managed by a sub-group (43% 20.5 FWI)*. He stated that although this risk is not being managed by a sub-group it was being managed by Network Rail. **CD/GB** agreed to change the wording of this bullet point from 'not being managed' to 'not being considered'. |
| 5.7 | **AS** referred to Chart 8 (page 32) showing trends in reported vandalism. He stated that the seasonal variation had greatly reduced over time. He was aware of school holiday campaigns and policies to ensure potential obstacles were not available to vandals but wanted to know why there was such a reduction over time.  

**[Post meeting note]:**  
The change in volatility could be explained by the overall reduction in other vandalism (includes cable theft), obstructions on the line and missiles thrown during the peak periods around April. Conversely, the troughs have not altered as much in the six years prior to the fourth quarter of 2013/14 and could be explained by:

- BTP and their specific targeting of hotspots and improved response times to those involved in crime. They have also improved surveillance which generally acts as a deterrent to perpetrators and is used to prosecute offenders.  
- The ongoing education (in school) and youth clubs (not in school) programmes, although it is very difficult to measure their effectiveness.  
- BTP increasing their patrols around Easter school holidays as this is when it becomes lighter in the evening and historically there has been an increase in trespass – this might be helping to reduce other crime.  
- Cable theft has been a specific area of interest for both Network Rail and BTP since 2011 so much of the reduction in other vandalism began mid-way through that year. |
| 5.8 | **CD** explained that the public risk paper would be submitted to the RSSB Board via correspondence. The minor amendments identified above would be made to the paper and the appropriate section of the SSRG meeting minutes would be attached to alert the Board to future changes going forward. **CD/GB** to make the minor amendments to the public risk paper and submit to the RSSB Board via correspondence. The SSRG minutes relating to suggestions for future risk papers to be attached. **[ACTON]**. |
| 5.9 | **AS** concluded the discussion stating that he thought that the paper was a very good piece of work. **AC** echoed this and thanked **CD** and his team for producing the paper. |