Formal Inquiries

Blaxhall report and recommendations

Railway Safety has issued its formal inquiry report into the passenger train / road vehicle collision that occurred at Blaxhall level crossing on 14 April 2002.

The formal inquiry was convened under independent chairmanship and included representatives on the panel from the involved parties. As with all such inquiries the panel's task was to establish the immediate and underlying causes of the accident and make recommendations to prevent or reduce the risk of recurrence.

Sequence of events

Shortly after 10 o'clock the train was approaching Blaxhall automatic open crossing, locally monitored (AOCL). The train driver received the AWS warning, cancelled it and reduced his speed to 45 mph. He clearly saw the Driver's White Light flashing and a short distance before the crossing (which he estimated at about a Unit length but which was probably more) he noticed a lorry travelling faster than normal, as though it would not stop at the crossing. He applied the emergency brake, put his arm up to protect his face and head and the train hit the rear of the lorry in the vicinity of its rear wheels. The rear wheelset of the leading bogie became derailed following the impact and the train came to a stand some 75 yards from the crossing. The driver, although shocked and injured, quickly checked that all passengers were safe and made an emergency broadcast on the RETB. He had the electronic token and was satisfied the train was fully protected. He spoke to the signaller at Saxmundham and arranged for the emergency services to be called.

Conclusions

The formal inquiry panel concluded that the immediate causes of the derailment were;

• A heavy goods vehicle operated by Kerr Farms, Hacheston, Suffolk was driven over Blaxhall Level Crossing in front of train 2D15 which collided with it and became derailed.

The underlying causes of the accident are summarised as follows:

• The driver of the road vehicle failed to observe and act upon the road traffic signals and audible warning which all evidence indicates were correctly working at the time.

Recommendations

The report makes recommendations for improvements in a number of key areas.

• Railtrack should provide control and signalling centres with Ordnance Survey grid references and details of access to level crossings, bridges, tunnels etc.
• In anticipation of the revised Railway Group Standard requiring AOCLs and open crossings to be converted within the next 10 years, Railtrack should:
  1. seek ways of considerably reducing the costs of conversion to barriered crossings;
  2. produce, by means of cost benefit analyses, a prioritised list of crossings for conversion.
• Railtrack should consider whether the risk limit used in its company procedure to require action is still satisfactory.

Railway Safety has issued a full copy of the report to each member of the Railway Group and the other organisations involved in the accident. All recipients of the report need to review the findings and recommendations and take actions where appropriate to address identified deficiencies within their own systems. Railway Safety will track the industry's response to this report.