Formal Inquiries

Stewarts Lane Viaduct (Eurostar) report and recommendations

Rail Safety and Standards Board has issued its formal inquiry report into the circumstances that led to the failure and prolonged delay of Eurostar service at Stewarts Lane Viaduct on Friday 7 February 2003.

The formal inquiry was convened under independent chairmanship and included representatives on the panel from the involved parties. As with all such inquiries the panel's task was to establish the immediate and underlying causes of the incident and make recommendations to prevent or reduce the risk of recurrence.

Sequence of events

The 1715hrs Waterloo International to Paris Gare du Nord, departed 11 minutes behind schedule and was stopped on Stewarts Lane Viaduct by the driver, at approximately 1740hrs, following an alert from the on board diagnostic computer. The driver was instructed to remain in his cab and await assistance from English Eurostar staff; the train remained immobilised on Stewarts Lane Viaduct.

The fault was eventually diagnosed as a detached main reservoir air pipe between two vehicles. Rescue of the train was complicated by isolation of the traction current as passengers disembarked on the viaduct, temporary failure of the Class 37 rescue locomotive, and the intervention of Civil Emergency Services, summoned to the train by distressed passengers.

The loss of hotel power to the train within 80 minutes caused discomfort on board, with no lighting, air conditioning, toilet facilities or secure door locking available. Passengers were then forced to take measures to allow fresh air into the train.

The disabled train was eventually towed back to Waterloo International arriving at 2246hrs.

Conclusions

The formal inquiry panel concluded that the immediate cause of this incident was the failure of the train set, due to the main reservoir flexible hose pipe becoming detached from its coupler between the 7th and 8th vehicles of the leading half set, NO. 373103

Further contributory causes were the communication breakdown between the French driver and Victoria signaller due to language difficulties, location and timing of the incident, on a viaduct and in the middle of the Friday evening rush-hour, which made management on-site and access more difficult.

Underlying causes were the failure to establish affective managerial arrangements on site and in the control offices for the duration of the incident, and the failure of the control offices to agree and implement an effective rescue plan in a timely manner. Lack of communication protocols between British Transport Police and Eurostar Control resulted in further delay to the rescue of the train, as did a brief failure of the pair of rescue locomotives. The use of an unauthorised route diagram, which included a different location name for the viaduct concerned, also contributed to the communication difficulties between driver and signaller.

Recommendations

The report makes recommendations for improvements in a number of key areas and these are summarised as follows.

• A technical review of the electro-pneumatic systems of the Eurostar Class 373 trains to be undertaken.
• A review of driver support arrangements to be undertaken.
• A review of requirements for language competence for all staff involved with international operations.
• A review of emergency and contingency plans in both Eurostar (UK) Limited and Network Rail.
• The importance of adhering to procedures in dealing with Emergency Services to be stressed in briefings with Network Rail and Eurostar (UK) Limited.
• The reliability and effectiveness of the rescue set operated by Eurostar (UK) limited to be reviewed.
• Consideration to be given to provision of long life span emergency drinking water supplies on board Eurostar train.
• Eurostar (UK) limited and Network Rail to cooperate to provide training for key personnel who may be required to manage at the site of an incident involving Eurostar trains.

Rail Safety and Standards Board has issued a full copy of the report to each member of the Railway Group and the other organisations involved in the incident. All recipients of the report need to review the findings and recommendations and take actions where appropriate to address identified deficiencies within their own systems. Rail Safety and Standards Board will track the industry's response to this report.