Formal Inquiries

Streatham Common report and recommendations

Rail Safety and Standards Board (RSSB) has issued its formal inquiry report into the circumstances that led to a train striking a road-rail vehicle (RRV) between Streatham Common and Balham on 11June 2004.

The formal inquiry was convened under independent chairmanship and included representatives on the panel from the involved parties. As with all such inquiries the panel's task was to establish the immediate and underlying causes of the accident and make recommendations to prevent or reduce the risk of recurrence.

Sequence of events

Planned track work on the Up Brighton Fast line at Streatham Common involved excavation and replacement of ballast. To achieve this work the maintenance team had brought onto site a road-rail 360° excavator with a trailer attached, which carried bags of ballast and a minidigger. This Road Rail Vehicle was mounted on the Down Brighton Fast line whilst the adjacent Up Brighton Slow line remained open to normal rail traffic. At some point during this work it became necessary to offload bags of ballast from the trailer and the team on site decided to use the RRV jib to do this. Whilst this was being done the RRV counterbalance became foul of the UP Brighton Slow line and an empty stock train struck it as it travelled past the site. The train and the RRV suffered damage and both the driver of the train and of the RRV were shaken but neither suffered serious injury.

Conclusions

The formal inquiry panel concluded that the RRV came into contact with the train because it was being operated in such a way as to foul the Up Brighton Slow line at the time the train was passing.

The panel also concluded that there were a number of underlying causes including:

• The planned method of working did not take account of the possibility of the machines fouling the adjacent open line.
• The planning process had not produced an adequate method statement.
• The method statement was not briefed to those working at the site and was not followed. Instead alternative methods were considered as options.
• Emergency actions were not taken in accordance with section G1 of the Rule Book.

Recommendations and actions

The report makes recommendations for improvements and suggests actions in a number of key areas and these are summarised as follows:

• The method of digging track ballast with an excavator should be critically examined to devise and specify a safe system of work.
• The controls specified (in Railway Group Standard Derogation 03/229DGN) for use of RRVs not fitted with secure movement limiting devices should be applied.

RSSB has issued a full copy of the report to each member of the Railway Group and the other organisations involved in the accident. All recipients of the report need to review the findings and recommendations and take actions where appropriate to address identified deficiencies within their own systems. RSSB will track the industry's response to this report.