



Rail Safety & Standards Board

# INFORMATION BULLETIN

## Formal Inquiry reports and recommendations

### Blake Street

Rail Safety and Standards Board (RSSB) has published the formal inquiry report into the circumstances that led a Class 66 locomotive to run away from a worksite at Blake Street, Birmingham and derail at Alrewas on the 7 August 2005.

The formal inquiry was convened under independent chairmanship and included representatives on the panel from the involved parties. As with all such inquiries the panel's task was to establish the immediate and underlying causes of the accident and make recommendations to prevent or reduce the risk of recurrence.

An incomplete application of the parking brake permitted the locomotive to run away from the site where it had been stabled on a 1 in 100 falling gradient, after the straight air brake application had leaked off.

A summary of this Report including the recommendations can be found at [www.rssb.co.uk/formal\\_2006r.asp](http://www.rssb.co.uk/formal_2006r.asp)

### Elsenham

Rail Safety and Standards Board (RSSB) has published the formal inquiry report into the circumstances that led to two young passengers being struck and fatally injured by the 0724 hrs Birmingham New Street to Stansted Airport train on the station footpath crossing at Elsenham on 3 December 2005.

The formal inquiry was convened under independent chairmanship and included representatives on the panel from the involved parties.

The two girls did not react to the red miniature warning light and yodel alarm, which visually and audibly indicated that it was not safe to open the wicket gate and use the station footpath crossing.

RSSB has issued a full copy of the respective reports to each member of the Railway Group and the other organisations involved in the accidents. All recipients of

the report need to review the findings and recommendations and take actions where appropriate to address identified deficiencies within their own systems. RSSB will track the industry's response to these reports.

A full report and summary including the recommendations can be found at [www.rssb.co.uk/formal\\_2006r.asp](http://www.rssb.co.uk/formal_2006r.asp)

For more details contact **Steve Burrows, inquiries manager** on **020 7904 7721** or email [steve.burrows@rssb.co.uk](mailto:steve.burrows@rssb.co.uk)

## Railway Group Standards Code Review

The publication of the Railways (Interoperability) Regulations 2006 and the Railways and Other Guided Transport Systems (Safety) Regulations 2006 mean that it is now appropriate to initiate a fundamental review of the Railway Group Standards Code.

Issue One of the Code was published on 19 January 2004. Issue Two was recently published on 1 February 2006, incorporating a number of changes to enable the Strategy for Standards Management to be delivered more efficiently, although the bulk of the document remained unchanged.

The review is to be undertaken by a working group reporting to the Industry Standards Coordination Committee. The primary aims of the review are to deliver a more flexible and efficient standards management process, to ensure that the Code is fit-for-purpose in the new British legislative environment and to achieve greater alignment of the British standards regime with that in Europe.

The working group will be led by Adam Milligan, Head of Systems Coordination at RSSB, and is aiming to deliver a revised draft for industry consultation in Winter 2006.

For more details contact **Adam Milligan, head of systems coordination** on **020 7904 7629** or email [adam.milligan@rssb.co.uk](mailto:adam.milligan@rssb.co.uk)



## Standards News

### Global System for Mobile Communications – Railway (GSM-R)

GSM-R is the technology and operation that will replace train to shore radio systems over the next 10 years. It is a specified system under interoperability and is mandatory when upgrading.

Consultation on the required amendments to the Rule Book in respect of GSM-R has been completed and comments are being considered. Work to identify the technical requirements to be incorporated into the rapid response document is continuing. Work has now commenced to review GE/RT8081 (Requirements for GSM-R Voice Radio System) to ensure that there are no contradictions between that and the new (rapid response) document for the Strathclyde trial. Discussions are being undertaken to resolve an issue regarding the scope of measures relating to human factors elements of the cab radio design. Consideration is being given to the issue of a Rail Industry Standard to address elements outside the scope of RGSs.

RSSB remain on schedule to submit final documents to standards committees for approval early June 2006. This will enable issuing in August 2006 - ahead of the first application of GSM-R in Strathclyde.

For more details contact **Steve Roberts, head of new systems** on **020 7904 7483** or email [steve.roberts@rssb.co.uk](mailto:steve.roberts@rssb.co.uk)



### Withdrawals of Standards

In accordance with the Strategy for Standards Management, Traffic Operation and Management Standards Committee endorsed the following standards to be withdrawn:

- GE/RT8067 - Personal Track Safety;
- GO/RT3358 - Persons Responsible for Protecting Work On or Near the Line, and it's associated railway approved Code of Practice - GO/RC3558;

- GI/RT7011 – Provision, Review and Risk Assessment of Level Crossings and it's associated Guidance.

For GE/RT8067 and GO/RT3358, publication of the withdrawal will take place in December 2006 with the documents ceasing to be in force in February 2007. For GI/RT7011, publication of the withdrawal will take place in August 2006 with the document ceasing to be in force in October 2006.

RSSB is managing the work now underway with members of the train operating community to develop guidance specific to train operators for personal track safety – once this has been completed, RSSB will publish the guidance.

For more details contact **Richard Evans, head of standards delivery (TOM)** on **020 7904 7633** or email [richard.evans@rssb.co.uk](mailto:richard.evans@rssb.co.uk)

### Publications and Withdrawals in the RGS Catalogue

Twenty-nine items were published or withdrawn in April 2006 Catalogue, as follows:

- a) One new Rail Industry Standard – RIS-1530-PLT Engineering Acceptance of Possession-Only Rail Vehicles and Associated Equipment.
- b) Ten up-issued documents - GO/RM3053 Working Manual for Rail Staff – Handling Carriage of Dangerous Goods, and its nine sections.
- c) Six Rule Book documents:
  - GE/RT8000/TW1 Preparation and movement of trains: General
  - GE/RT8000/TS3 Absolute block regulations
  - GE/RT8000/TW8 Level crossings
  - GE/RT8000/BRIEF Rule Book Briefing Leaflet
  - GE/RT8000/Issue Rule Book Issue History
  - GE/RT8000/AM Amendments Module
- d) GE/RT8001 Changes to Specified Operations Publications
- e) 11 Withdrawals:
  - GM/TT0136 Plant and Machine Room Management
  - GM/RC1501 Code of Practice – Maintenance of Jardine and Smith Warning Device
  - GM/RC2518 Code of Practice – Welding, Cutting and Repair of Railborne Plant
  - GC/RT5153 Subterranean Fires - Managing the Risk
  - GC/RT5100 Safe Management of Structures
  - GC/RT5122 Bridge Strikes from Road Vehicles or Waterborne Vessels
  - GC/RT5143 Flooding, Scour, Wave and Tidal Action – Managing the Risk
  - GC/RT5180 Safe Asset Management of Infrastructure – Tunnels
  - GC/RC5511 Recommendations for the Safety Management of Structures



- GO/RT3261 Persons in Charge of Possession (PICOP) and Engineering Supervisors (ES)
- GE/GN8518 Guidance on Identification of Responsibilities at Stations

For more details contact **Marie Marks head of standards management** on **020 7904 7588** or email [marie.marks@rssb.co.uk](mailto:marie.marks@rssb.co.uk)

**Rule Book Modules, T2 and T12** (Protecting engineering work or a hand trolley on a line not under possession) and (Protecting personnel carrying out activities on the line that do not affect the safety of the line)

Following a proposal from the Rules Simplification Sub-group, the Rule Book Modules, T2 and T12 are under review.

As well as the opportunity to simplify the rules and make them easier to understand, there may be performance benefits in making T12 more accessible for activities that do not affect the safety of trains.

The output of the work will be presented back to the Rules Simplification Sub-group for consideration at its next meeting.

Significant work has been carried out by both the RSSB's Rules Team and the Decision Support Manager to analyse the changes, ranging from wording changes to key changes in principles, together with identifying the impacts of each change and identifying where more detailed justification will be necessary.

For more details contact **Luisa Moio, decision support manager (TOM)** on **020 7904 7669** or email [luisa.moio@rssb.co.uk](mailto:luisa.moio@rssb.co.uk)

### Defective On-Train Equipment

There may be scope to relax the current rules relating to defective power-operated doors without adversely impacting current levels of safety and to improve operating performance.

The work carried out to date on Defective On-Train Equipment would support the view there is scope to change the rules relating to defective power-operated doors (Rule Book, Module TW2). Phase 1 of risk assessment work has been delivered. The report is being reviewed by the TOM Delivery Unit and the Risk & Safety Intelligence team. A summary of the outputs was presented to TOM Standards Committee and to Association of Train Operators Operations Council in April.

Work is now underway to develop a proposal, which would relax the rules relating to defective power-operated doors without adversely affecting current levels of safety.

The Phase 2 contract has now been let for approximately 17 items of other on-train equipment.

For more details contact **Richard Evans, head of standards delivery (TOM)** on **020 7904 7633** or email [richard.evans@rssb.co.uk](mailto:richard.evans@rssb.co.uk)

Got an issue with a Railway Group Standard? Call the **RSSB Enquiry Desk** on **020 7904 7518** or email [enquirydesk@rssb.co.uk](mailto:enquirydesk@rssb.co.uk)

If that doesn't sort out the issue please contact **Anson Jack, director standards** on **020 7904 7703**.

## Latest Safety Management Information System (SMIS) upgrade

The Safety Management Information System (SMIS) is the industry's national IT safety recording system. It is used by all Railway Group members to record all safety related accidents and incidents that occur on Network Rail's controlled infrastructure. This is a key tool that allows the industry to analyse risk, products and trends.

As part of RSSB's on-going commitment to assisting the rail industry with the recording of safety related data, a significant SMIS upgrade has recently been undertaken. This consists of 10 'minor' enhancements that were requested by a number of different bodies including SMIS users. No additional funding was required from the industry for this upgrade, as it was covered by the existing support contract.

The main theme was to improve the usability of the application.

A summary of these enhancements is shown below:

- Prevent a personal accident component from being included in a railway incident event.
- Improve the means for recording a train being taken out of service (as per GE/RT3437- Defective On Board Train Equipment).
- Only allow for 'Whole system/shock' to be added when injury degree equals 'Shock/trauma' and move the injury degree field to below the body part and injury nature suffered fields.
- Recording of train despatch methods, in relation to a joint industry DOO review.



- When an event has only one component, remove the need to set it as 'prime'.
- The ability to clear the last classification question.
- Change the order of the workflow tree to improve data entry.
- Allow any user to view any statutory report.
- Remove the possibility of duplicate objects being created by SMIS.
- Remove the requirement to enter a location for each component.

Please contact **Jeff Brewer, SMIS business manager** on **020 7904 7509** or email [jeff.brewer@rssb.co.uk](mailto:jeff.brewer@rssb.co.uk) for further information.

## Systems Interface Committees

For the past two years the six System Interface Committees (SICs), facilitated by RSSB, have been contributing to overcoming issues with railway systems and the problems that arise at the interface between industry partners by bringing the parties together and tackling problems at a system level. A vital part of this work is communication in order to break down barriers between different parties and to raise the general industry awareness of the issues being tackled by the SICs and their sub groups.

As part of the communications process, which also includes hosting industry seminars and running an Extranet site containing SIC related information and technical reports, most of the SICs have published newsletters. The SIC newsletters inform the industry of progress and highlight the work of the SICs. These bulletins have proved to be popular, but have previously been circulated with the RSSB Information Bulletin to known railway industry members only.


In order to make this information accessible to a wider audience, and to ensure that the most recent information is readily available to interested parties, the SIC newsletter will be published on the RSSB website within the section already dedicated to SICs - [www.rssb.co.uk/sysic.asp](http://www.rssb.co.uk/sysic.asp)

For more details contact **Adam Milligan, head of systems coordination** on **020 7904 7629** or email [adam.milligan@rssb.co.uk](mailto:adam.milligan@rssb.co.uk)

## New Temporary SIC Chairs

Rebeka Sellick is on maternity leave and her position as Chair of the Vehicle / Vehicle SIC is being covered by Phil Hinde, ATOC's Engineering Strategy Manager until Rebeka returns. Her position on the Vehicle / Structures and Vehicle / Track SIC's are currently held by Ian Papworth who is Acting Engineering Director at ATOC

## Spotlight



### Annual Safety Performance Report 2005

Rail Safety and Standards Board (RSSB) has published its Annual Safety Performance Report. The headlines are:

- There were no passenger or workforce fatalities in train accidents in 2005. This was for the third year within the last decade.
- Eight passengers died in accidents at stations. Alcohol was a contributory factor in five of the cases.
- Five members of the workforce died in accidents in the trackside environment.
- 95% of fatalities that occurred to members of the public were due to suicide (including cases of suspected suicide) and trespass. Of the 13 public fatalities not due to these causes, the majority occurred at level crossings.
- The behaviour of road users at level crossings remains a significant issue in relation to the risk from train accidents.
- The number of potentially higher risk train accidents reduced by 19%.

The industry objective as outlined in the Strategic Safety Plan is to reduce the risk from signals passed at danger (SPADs) by 70% of the March 2001 baseline level was achieved in April 2005. By the end of the year, SPAD risk had been reduced by 87%.

For more information contact **Liz Davies, strategic intelligence manager** on **020 7904 7493** or email [liz.davies@rssb.co.uk](mailto:liz.davies@rssb.co.uk)

The 2005 Annual Safety Performance Report is available on the RSSB website at [www.rssb.co.uk/spreports.asp](http://www.rssb.co.uk/spreports.asp)

Event 28 - 29 June 2006 Risk Management Forum  
University of Nottingham