

# ROGS IMPLEMENTATION BRIEFING 2006

## **Railways and other Guided Transport Systems (Safety) Regulations 2006 (ROGS)**

### **Implementation Briefing September/October 2006**

Supported by:

ATOC, C2C Rail, Chiltern Railways, EWS, First Engineering, First Group, Freightliner, Grantrail on behalf of ISLG, LUL, National Express, Network Rail, ORR, Porterbrook, South West Trains, RIA, and RSSB

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Interoperability & ROGS – Verification Regimes


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
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## The Old Regime



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## The New Order



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## The New Order

- HMG authorisation under the Interoperability Regs
  - New works or Major upgrades
  - or
- Safety Verification as part of a Safety Management System
  - Significant changes creating significant risk
- Nothing else

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## Objectives of Verification

- Demonstrate the subsystem meets the Essential Requirements for a railway system (primarily safety)
  - By complying with standards
  - By being properly integrated into the railway system (compatibility)


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## Which Process?

Interoperability  
MS Authorisation

Is it on the TEN?  
*(infrastructure only)*

ROGS  
Safety Verification



*(infrastructure only)*

No further requirement

No


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## Which Process?

Interoperability  
MS Authorisation

Is it on the TEN?  
*(infrastructure only)*

ROGS  
Safety Verification



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## The Changes

### Processes

*Safety Case*  
*ROTS*  
*RSAB*  
*VAB*

### Standards

*ROTS Inspector's judgement of ALARP*  
*RSAB's judgement of ALARP*  
*RGS (incl. VAB judgement of ALARP)*  
*Safety Case approver's judgement of ALARP*

### Decision for Authorisation

*ROTS Inspector*  
*Network Rail*  
*VAB*  
*HMRI*

← **RU/IM's SMS** →  
 Comply with standards, be compatible

Normally

Internal  
 Process

Significant  
 risk

Use CP  
 verification  
 as part of  
 SMS

New & Major

Verify SMS  
 results using  
 NoBo

National Standards

[But as TSIs=ALARP  
 could use TSI where it  
 exists and derogate  
 from RGS]

TSIs  
 (incl. Notified  
 National  
 Technical  
 Rules = RGS)

**IM/RU**

HMRI  
 Checking  
 NoBo  
 Certificate

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## “Significant” ⇒ Safety Verification

Safety Certificate/Authorisation holder has a choice:

- Standards based, verification by independent CP
  - Verify compliance with standards
  - Verify compatibility
  - Record details in a project file
- Project Safety Case/Yellow Book Process
  - Concept feasibility
  - Design & Integrity check
  - Manufacture
  - Test & Verify


## How Safe is Safe Enough?

- TSIs + NNTRs =  
Ess. Rqmts =  
ALARP
- That's it (nothing  
else needed)
- If MS decides it isn't,  
change the TSI
- No Safety Case  
needed
- Compatibility = Duty  
Holder decides
- Duty Holder can  
always decide to go  
for more

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## Placing Infrastructure & Trains into Service

Appoint your verifier



Technical/Project File includes:

Certification for ICs used, conditions of use, limitations of use, servicing, monitoring, adjustment and maintenance instructions

Verification is one time only for the type, the first time it is put into service