Safety Performance Reports

Overview of Safety Performance for 2011

This note provides a high-level overview of safety performance on Great Britain’s mainline railway for the calendar year 2011.

Overview of Safety Performance 2011

RSSB's Half-Year Safety Performance Report is an update of the main ASPR, which can be found below. It provides data on the same key areas for the period April to September 2011.

Half-year safety performance report 2011/12

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 RSSB's Annual Safety Performance Report (ASPR) examines the range of risk experienced by passengers, the railway workforce and members of the public, before considering areas that affect all railway users: train accidents, personal security, level crossings and stations. We have also included sections on progress against the Strategic Safety Plan trajectories, benchmarking railway performance, data quality, and European Common Safety Indicators and Targets.

Note that chapter and section links have been included (in blue) in the main ASPR to aid navigation.

 ASPR 2010/11 Presentation slides

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Monthly Summary of Safety Performance

This provides information on fatalities, reportable train accidents and accident precursors for the month in question.Graphic representations of trends are also included.

 Monthly Summary of Safety Performance December 2011

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Passenger risk at the platform-train interface

The platform-train interface gives rise to a risk unique to rail transport. This risk forms a significant proportion of the total risk faced by rail passengers, especially fatality risk.  

Mindful of an increase in the number of accidents since 2005, the Operations Focus Group requested that RSSB undertake analysis into accidents occurring to passengers at the platform-train interface.

The report, published in June 2011, contains analyses into the many possible factors that can influence the occurrence of accidents of this type.

Passenger risk at the platform train interface

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Over the last ten years, the rail industry has seen extensive changes, including institutional reorganisation, significant growth and further investment. Sustained improvements in safety performance and risk have resulted from many of these changes, together with the efforts of railway managers and staff to continuously improve. Some improvements derive from the learning that is taken from operational experience and accidents.

This report summarises the overall reduction in risk to passengers and staff from train accidents (80% in the ten years up to October 2009), the associated improvements in engineering and safety, and the industry positions which support this state.

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Shunting is one of the highest risk occupations on the railway. This special topic report that looks at the risks faced by shunters and discusses the underlying causes that contribute to the current risk level.

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One of RSSB'S suite of topic-specific reports, this documents reviews the risk and safety situation at this widely-used interface. All aspects of station safety are included,using data up to 30 June 2006.

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An offence committed on railway property is a railway problem. This report presents the levels of risk to passengers, the workforce and members of the public from crime.It also outlines the underlying causes that contribute to the current risk level,using data up to 31 March 2006.

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This report examines the road-rail interface safety performance recorded on Network Rail managed infrastructure (NRMI) over the last ten years and the estimated underlying level of risk derived from version 6 of the Safety Risk Model (SRMv6). The report presents data trends around level crossings, bridge strikes and incursion incidents. It provides a picture of the risk and safety situation at the interface, using data up to 31 December 2009.

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This reveals that 35% of the total mainline railway risk is attributable to railway staff- a group which may be divided into three subgroups:trackworkers, train crew and other workforce. Each is considered in turn in this document, which covers all aspects of workforce safety,using information up to 31 July 2006.

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SPAD/TPWS Reports

 Quarter 2 SPAD & TPWS Report 2011/12 (Overview)
 Quarter 2 SPAD & TPWS Report 2011/12
This report summarises category A signal passed at danger (SPAD) performance and train protection and warning system (TPWS) activity for Quarter 2 2011/12 

There were 80 SPADs in Q2-2011/12, bringing the moving annual total for to 312.  This compares to 267 during the preceding year. Of the 312 SPADs, 92 were risk ranked 16 or above (17 of which were risk ranked 20+).  The risk from SPADs, as at the end of September, was 69% of the September 2006 benchmark.

 Quarter 1 SPAD & TPWS Report 2011/12 (Overview)
 Quarter 1 SPAD & TPWS Report 2011/12
This report summarises category A signal passed at danger (SPAD) performance and train protection and warning system (TPWS) activity for Quarter 1 2011/12 

There were 70 SPADs in Q1-2011/12, bringing the moving annual total for to 295.  This compares to 299 during the preceding year. Of the 295 SPADs, 91 were risk ranked 16 or above (19 of which were risk ranked 20+).  The risk from SPADs, as at the end of June, was 89% of the September 2006 benchmark.

 Quarter 4 SPAD & TPWS Report 2010/11 (Overview)
 Quarter 4 SPAD & TPWS Report 2010/11 
This report summarises category A signal passed at danger (SPAD) performance and train protection and warning system (TPWS) activity for 2010/11.

There were 63 SPADs in Q3‑2010/11, bringing the moving annual total for to 299.  This compares to 275 during the preceding year.  This is an increase of 8.7%.  Of the 299 SPADs, 87 were risk ranked 16 or above (17 of which were risk ranked 20+).  There was a ‘reset & continue’ event on 13 March, bringing the total for 2010/11 to three.

 Quarter 3 SPAD & TPWS Report 2010/11 (Overview)
 Quarter 3 SPAD & TPWS Report 2010/11
This report summarises category A signal passed at danger (SPAD) performance and train protection and warning system (TPWS) activity for Q3 2011

SPAD TPWS Update for January 2012
 
This is an update regarding category A SPAD and TPWS performance for the month of January 2012. It is based on data available as at the date of issue and may be subject to change as further information becomes known

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